As We Predicted the Housing Delivery Test is Toothless

Natanial Lictchfield

On 19th January 2021, MHCLG published the
results of the 2020 Housing Delivery Test. It
shows that 17% of local planning authorities
(55 authorities) face the presumption in favour
of sustainable development or ‘tilted balance’
penalty.
Spatially, this under-delivery is most acute in
the greater southeast and southern coastal areas;
however there is a challenge amongst some of
the north-western local authorities particularly
those surrounding Greater Manchester. 20%
of the LPAs in question did not have an up-todate Local Plan. It seems likely that slow Plan
preparation (which in itself may be impacted
by the challenges surrounding Green Belt
designations) plays a role in under-delivery.
Ultimately, the HDT’s tilted balance mechanism
is designed to boost housing delivery in poorly
performing local authorities by making it easier
to secure permission for unplanned housing
development. However:

1. The majority of the authorities in question
   (44 out of 55) either have a housing land
   supply evidence base which is out of date,
   or agree that they cannot demonstrate a
   5YHLS. In such areas, a review of appeal
   decisions has confirmed that inspectors
   are not applying ‘additional’ weight in
   these cases (combining the failure to meet
   the HDT and 5YHLS targets), as the tilted
   balance is already engaged.
2. Most of the HDT presumption authorities
   are significantly constrained by the
   Green Belt and/or other footnote 6
   designations, meaning that the very special
   circumstances required to justify new
   housing development is likely to deactivate
   the tilted balance on designated sites. A
   review of appeal decisions has confirmed
   that in almost all cases, the tilted balance
   is disengaged or outweighed by the need
   to demonstrate VSC, which neuters the
   effectiveness of the HDT ‘stick’.
3. Of the 11 authorities with a stated 5YHLS
   (meaning the tilted balance could be
   triggered as a direct result of the HDT
   failure), 7 are heavily constrained by
   footnote 6/Green Belt designations,
   effectively disengaging the tilted balance in
   many cases.
4. Of the remaining 4 authorities, three are
   predominantly urban in nature, which may
   reduce the impact of the tilted balance on
   speculative greenfield housing sites in real
   terms.
5. The result is that in practice, housing supply
   in just one authority (Thanet) is likely to be
   significantly boosted by the presumption in
   favour of sustainable development triggered
   by the HDT.
   Based on the analysis above, it would appear
   that the Government’s HDT mechanism
   which seeks to address under-delivery is, in
   the vast majority of cases, toothless. Without
   significant reform, this represents a flawed
   policy mechanism which derives from the
   fundamental clash between the need to provide
   more housing versus the understandable desire
   to protect footnote 6 land. This is particularly
   concerning, given that the Government’s
   current proposals to reform the planning system
   recommend the removal of the 5YHLS penalty
   in its entirety, and to rely on the HDT alone to
   boost housing delivery in poorly performing
   council areas.